文献类型：会议论文

英文题名：Observability of non-cooperative adaptive games

作者：Zeng, Cheng Xiang, Shuwen

第一作者：Zeng, Cheng

通信作者：Zeng, C[1];Zeng, C[2]|[14440724ae58632e7c57f]曾诚;

机构：[1]Coll Comp Sci & Technol, Guiyang, Guizhou, Peoples R China;[2]Guizhou Inst Technol, Sch Sci, Guiyang, Guizhou, Peoples R China;[3]Guizhou Univ, Sch Math & Stat, Guiyang, Guizhou, Peoples R China

第一机构：Coll Comp Sci & Technol, Guiyang, Guizhou, Peoples R China

通信机构：corresponding author), Coll Comp Sci & Technol, Guiyang, Guizhou, Peoples R China;corresponding author), Guizhou Inst Technol, Sch Sci, Guiyang, Guizhou, Peoples R China.|贵州理工学院理学院;贵州理工学院;

会议论文集：International Conference on Advanced Mechatronic Systems (ICAMechS)

会议日期：AUG 30-SEP 02, 2018

会议地点：Zhengzhou, PEOPLES R CHINA

语种：英文

外文关键词：non-cooperative adaptive games; observability; Nash equilibrium

年份：2018

摘要：Controlling complex systems to desired states is a very important issue in science and engineering. In the paper, we consider a new class of control systems based on non-cooperative adaptive games which can give some light on this kind of complex systems. It involves a hierarchal decision making structure: one leader and multiple followers. Given any strategy of the leader, the followers can form a non-cooperative adaptive game which may reach a Nash equilibrium. We can study the leader's observability of such an equilibrium which has not be investigated before. It seems to be a new direction of adaptive games from the perspective of control and beyond the frameworks of both the traditional control theory and game theory. More importantly, the resulting adaptive profile is shown to have some nice stability and convergence properties, for example, an asymptotic Nash equilibrium can be reached.