文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Essential equilibria of n-person noncooperative games

作者：Yu J.

通信作者：Yu, J[1]

机构：[1]Guizhou Inst Technol, Inst Appl Math, Guiyang 550003, Guizhou, Peoples R China

第一机构：贵州理工学院理学院

通信机构：corresponding author), Guizhou Inst Technol, Inst Appl Math, Guiyang 550003, Guizhou, Peoples R China.|贵州理工学院理学院;贵州理工学院;

年份：1999

卷号：31

期号：3

起止页码：361-372

外文期刊名：JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000079729800005)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000079729800005)】；

语种：英文

外文关键词：essential equilibrium points; noncooperative finite games; essential game; correspondence

摘要：In this paper, we prove that most of the games (in the sense of Baire Category) are essential of weakly essential for the following three models: (A) the games parametrized by payoffs; (B) games parametrized by payoffs and strategy spaces; and (C) games parametrized by payoffs and feasible strategy correspondences. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.